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For in the small world in which we live we no longer have unlimited time
to demonstrate that we actually believe the ideals that we profess.
IRVING DILLIARDt
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE: V, FREE MAN VERSUS His GOVERN-
MENT. Edited by Arthur L. Harding. Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 117. $3.00.
"Free Man Versus His Government" resounds with echoes of a call
to revolution, but a brief reflection on the Latin divider variously abbre-
viated v. and vs. brings apprehension of the frequently dull form of de-
bate called litigation. This title identifies four essays from the 1957
Conference on Law in Society presented by the Southwestern Legal
Foundation and the Southern Methodist University School of Law.' No
revolutionary tocsins sound among them or in any of them. Motions
for continuance and settlement negotiations, with even a few expressions
of expectation that settlement will be on mutually advantageous terms,
are more frequent than requests for peremptory instructions or notices
of appeal.
Professor Beutel2 on "Freedom of Political Association" does appeal
from decisions supporting exculpatory oaths and decisions holding that
the federal government cannot protect freedom of political assembly for
a non-federal purpose from private interference. Professor Harding'
on !"Freedom to Use Property" is content to assert that private property
is here to stay. He indicates that the "bundle of rights" has been re-
sorted and new sticks have been added in such a way as to recognize
more economic values and make them more valuable by achieving a bal-
ance of social interests that works to enhance freedom. The manner here
is less of the indictment or brief and more of the historical survey.
Professor Stumpf4 on "Freedom to Learn" comes to three opinions
of truth in the realm of values. He chooses continual rational examina-
tion and restatement, based on faith in absolute truth and skepticism of
t Irving Dilliard is an editorial writer for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and from
1949 to 1957 was editor of its editorial page. Among his publications are Mr. Justice
Brandeis: Great American and The Spirit of Liberty: The Addresses and Papers of
Learned Hand.
1. The present volume is the fifth of a series which was begun in 1954.
2. Frederick K. Beutel, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
3. Arthur L. Harding, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
4. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University.
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the degree to which its discovery has been approximated. This is a syn-
thesis of the other two views, absolute skepticism and absolute certainty.
Dean Cuninggim' on "Freedom to Believe" is also a moderate: the law
(in the United States) does not grant a boundless freedom to believe,
nor does it coerce conformity to the Christian code; this freedom, defined
as freedom to take religious belief into account in words and actions, is
limited for any person by "the point at which he seriously offends Chris-
tian sensibilities or breaks some major precept of the Christian code."6
Both contributors are concerned with human action in connection with
learning and believing, Stumpf with the effect of beliefs upon legal re-
striction, and Cuninggim with the effect of legal restrictions of actions
upon belief. Neither is concerned to debate the possibility of individual
moral responsibility, but rather both undertake to state the legal condi-
tions for its development, in the tradition of John Stuart Mill.
Freedom in the United States is the subject of these essays, although
there is reference to Rome and Moscow and to the history of thought in
Judea and Western Europe. The general picture that is drawn depicts a
process of revision, if not devitalization, of the substantive values ex-
pressed in legal institutions, in favor of procedural values. To illustrate:
Cuninggim suggests, at least by implication, that only in marginal situa-
tions (blasphemy, polygamy, but not now even in refusal to bear arms)
does truth have rights superior to error. Stumpf shows how the values
embodied in legal commands are subject to denial, so that legal processes
are subordinate to learning processes. And Beutel and Harding provide
an interesting contrast between the increasingly malleable substantive
rights of property and the absolute quality of the procedural right of
peaceable political assembly. Beutel and Stumpf together advocate pro-
cesses of exchange of opinion and obtaining consensus, which Stumpf at-
tributes to absolute ethical values of individual dignity, freedom, and
equality, and Beutel to the absolute constitutional value of free assembly.
Cuninggim and Harding tend to describe particulars of religious codes
and the institution of property in terms of instrumental values subject to
revision by democratic procedures.
Democratic procedures, in turn, are characterized by constitutional
values that inhibit governmental or private interferences with the discus-
sion process. The broader Stumpf formulation in terms of learning, how-
ever, leads him to absolute non-instrumental values, substantive goals.
5. Merrimon Cuninggim, Dean and Professor, Perkins School of Theology, South-
ern Methodist University.
6. HARDING, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE: V, FRE MAN VERSUS His GOVERNMENT
19 (1958).
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His recognition of the claims of order with respect to human action that
is not merely communicative, and their impact in turn upon freedom of
communication itself, seems to touch upon the slogan of fraternity, al-
though he does not use the word. He does in terms designate as demo-
cratic ideals the notions of individual dignity, freedom, and equality.
Surely the tensions between freedom and equality and between fraternity
and freedom provide space for wide choice of instrumental values, and
even embodiment of contradictory ones in law.
Your reviewer would propose that the claims of privacy not be ig-
nored, in terms of individual dignity, in estimating the claims of learning.
He would also register skepticism, although regretfully, that the powers
of reason can achieve a recurrent consensus in the application of these
ideals to experience, in the process of discovering limits to choice of
values in law. This is not to gainsay the priority assigned to discussion-
and-vote over industrial or military might. This priority is a worthy
choice among human values, and may contain more for survival than cold
wars of goods or of arms.
Not a call for revolution, not a debate, but a workmanlike effort to
apply reason, in the twentieth century, to Western experience.
IVAN C. RUTLEDGEt
URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY. By Donald
H. Webster.1  New York: Harper & Brothers. 1958. Pp. xii, 572.
$8.00.
That America has become an urban society is an accomplished twen-
tieth century fact. With the completion of the new interstate highway
network, not only will the smallest county seat be brought closer to its city
brother but suburban development at the interchanges is expected to pro-
ject the urban sprawl even farther into the rural countryside. Accord-
ingly, it is high time for the lawyer, if he has not already done so, to
pay attention to the ever-multiplying regulation of land use by towns,
cities, and counties. As an introduction to the background and content
of urban land use controls, this book can be most helpful.
Professor Webster's book is divided into four parts. Part I deals
with the governmental framework of planning. To the reader who is
at all versed in the organization of local government this section is an
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Washington.
